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The way in which states formulate national positions is just
as important to EU decision-making as their bargaining
strength in the Council.
Blog Admin
Which states get their way most often in the EU’s legislative process? Responding to an
earlier EUROPP article, Stuart A Brown argues that analyses of Council decision-making
must also account for the way in which states formulate their preferences prior to
negotiations. While Council agreements on EU legislation appear to be more closely in line
with the positions of smaller states like Finland, this does not necessarily mean that they
have the most influence over the EU policy process as a whole.
In a recent EUROPP article Jonathan Golub presents a study of  the bargaining success
of  individual EU Member States in Council decision-making. The analysis shows that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, EU legislation tends to be more in line with the posit ions of  smaller states like
Finland and Luxembourg, rather than larger states such as Germany and France. He argues that
explaining this phenomenon is of  vital importance both to accounts of  EU decision-making and wider
debates concerning the legit imacy of  the integration process.
The notion that a state such as Luxembourg can exert more authority in negotiations than Germany is
so counter- intuit ive that it might be tempting to reject it outright. However aside f rom some slight
qualif iers about the methodology – such as the f act that the data only covers a f airly short period of
time – there is lit t le reason to assume that the analysis is incorrect. Rather, what may explain the results
is the omission of  a crucial part of  the decision-making process: the f ormation of  pref erences prior to
negotiations in the Council.
Why Preference Formation Matters
When national representatives arrive at EU discussions they don’t have a blank slate, but instead enter
negotiations with a set of  predetermined pref erences. These pref erences are unequal, in the sense that
some posit ions are more likely to be accepted by the remaining Member States than others. Clearly if  a
state holds a particularly unpopular posit ion at the beginning of  the discussions then, regardless of  how
well they make the case, their chances of  success are likely to be f airly limited. The way in which a state
f ormulates its negotiating posit ion theref ore has an impact on how we assess that state’s inf luence
over decision-making. If  smaller states simply enter into EU negotiations with more agreeable policy
posit ions, then their apparent success would not really be a genuine ref lection of  their bargaining
strength.
A hypothetical example illustrates the
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A hypothetical example illustrates the
point. Imagine that the standard
understanding of  EU decision-making is
correct and France, Germany and the UK
(the “big three” EU states) are dominant
when it comes to negotiating EU
legislation. For argument’s sake, let’s say
that these three states are so dominant
that every piece of  legislation, without
exception, ref lects either the French,
German, or Brit ish posit ion. If  we assume
that all three states are just as powerf ul
as each other and that they rarely
collaborate, then these three countries will
only have their posit ion accepted around
33 per cent of  the time – because,
ult imately, only one of  the three countries
can be successf ul f or any given piece of  legislation.
Smaller states, in contrast, would presumably have litt le incentive in this situation to pursue an
independent line. If  every piece of  legislation ref lected the French, German, or Brit ish posit ion, then the
best strategy f or smaller states would simply be to adopt one of  these three models as their own.
Despite the f act that their posit ion would essentially be entirely dependent on the largest three states,
smaller countries might nevertheless appear to get their way more of ten in discussions if  they regularly
picked the ‘winning’ model. It would obviously be incorrect in this case to say that smaller states wield
more inf luence in the Council: outcomes would merely be a f unction of  the inf luence the big three states
have had over smaller countries in the pref erence f ormation stage.
The Flexibility of Smaller States
Clearly EU decision-making does not work in the specif ic manner outlined above, but the example
illustrates the point that the f ormation of  national pref erences is a process worthy of  study in its own
right. It might be the case that smaller states simply benef it f rom some bias in this process that leads to
them entering discussions with more agreeable posit ions than their larger rivals. What might generate
this ef f ect?
One hypothesis could be that smaller states are simply much more f lexible in terms of  adapting their
posit ions to current trends than larger states. It ’s long been recognised that EU states have an incentive
to ‘upload’ their domestic policies to the European level. While this might be credible f or a large state
such as France, Germany, or the UK, the chances of  a small state such as Luxembourg ‘uploading’ its
policies to the European level and having them accepted by the rest of  the Council would appear less
likely. Moreover, a smaller state’s domestic policies might already be heavily inf luenced by its larger
neighbours. Although this is a sign of  weakness, it could also of f er smaller states f lexibility in the sense
that they are more likely to adapt quickly to new policy developments.
An illustrative example might be the spread of  languages. If  we took a random collection of  27 polit icians
(one f rom each EU member state) and asked them to decide on a single language in which to write a
joint-statement, we could assume that they would decide on one of  the most widely spoken languages in
Europe: such as English, French, Spanish or German. This partly ref lects the inf luence that these
languages have had on smaller states. An Estonian, f or instance, is much more likely to speak English as
a second language than a Brit ish person is to speak Estonian. Because the Estonian language is not a
credible alternative in the discussion, however, it might be the case that the Estonian polit ician would be
more in line with current trends (such as the trend f or speaking English) than say, the French
representative. Put simply, Estonia’s weakness actually makes it more likely that it will f ormulate a
pref erence that matches the majority opinion.
Indeed in this example we might expect countries like France, Spain and Germany to ‘lose’ in negotiations
most of ten. Far f rom being a sign of  overall weakness, this would occur precisely because French,
Spanish and German are among the most popular f oreign languages f or European speakers af ter
English. The very f act that they are credible alternatives to English (while languages like Estonian are
not) could make it less likely that these countries will embrace the prevailing model (English) as quickly as
other states.
Much like languages, policies spread across dif f erent territories in a way which might lead to weaker
states adapting to popular trends more quickly than their larger rivals. This is merely one way in which the
f ormation of  national pref erences could have an impact on how we assess the inf luence of  individual
states over EU decision-making. Determining which states get their way most of ten in the EU’s legislative
process is an extremely complex task, but without an account of  how states arrive at their posit ions any
analysis is likely to be incomplete.
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